Accidents due to medical gas systems being incorrectly installed or assembled have drawn attention to the need for rigid control over maintenance of contracts and standards, communication and responsibility allocation whenever work on such systems is undertaken. The format of a Permit to Work System introduced into a large general hospital is described, based on local needs, and its application has highlighted the value of such a system.
In many hospitals gas delivery systems comprising tank or cylinder sources, pipeline reticulation, valves, outlets and delivery systems such as flowmeters and anaesthetic machines are subject to interference, malfunction, misuse, contamination and poor maintenance in the same way as electrical reticulation systems and their associated machinery. In the hospital environment these systems are intimately involved in life-support functions and it is a sine qua non that they be maintained to a 100070 efficiency and safety level.
Accidents in a number of hospitals, occuring as a result of incorrect gas connections being made, have drawn attention to the need for rigid control to avoid cross connection of pipes and hoses and sudden disruptions of supply. Two such accidents in the United Kingdom in 1973 and 1975 resulted in large awards of damages and enquiries which made 24 and 14 recommendations respectively.I,2
The recommendations, many common to both enquiries, included general and specific points relating to the servicing of equipment, maintenance of promulgated standards of equipment design, organisation and performance and staff awareness of these, responsibilities of and clinical awareness by anaesthetists in particular, procedures to be followed in the event of mishap, the fixing and distinguishing of gas supply hoses, the use of alternative systems, the need for communication, cost benefit considerations and central guidance from health departments.
The Board of Management of a hospital, through its administrator, is responsible for many facets of routine maintenance, including those pertaining to piped medical gases, medical vacuum and anaesthetic equipment. Maintenance contracts may be organised through the supplies officer who would normally obtain details of requirements from the engineering department and department of anaesthesia. Contracts relating to anaesthetic machines and associated equipment normally specify the frequency of maintenance and should incorporate a planned preventative maintenance programme and call-up procedure, a progressing and record system, and be designed to excluide any unauthorised work being carried out. Checks on the contractor's operative are required and he should have a designated point of contact prior to and following completion of maintenance.
The events in the United Kingdom highlighted two other problems. The first related to difficulties in defining responsibilities where interfacing of equipment from two manufacturers occurs. The second concerned lines of communication and responsibility where no policy in regard to these had been defined. Thus it was that the Department of Health and Social Security in the United Kingdom published the "Permit to Work System" in 1977, as a supplement to Health Technical Memorandum No. 22.3 
Introduction into a general hospital
Although Royal Perth Hospital held a service contract for the maintenance of anaesthetic machines no forum existed through which a coordinated approach in respect of problems relating to gas systems should be channelled. An Electrical Safety Committee comprised of representative members of appropriate departments (physics, nursing, anaesthesia, engineering and administrative) and reporting to the hospital administrator, seemed appropriate to deal with problems relating to medical gas safety. It was agreed that the terms of reference of the Electrical Safety Committee should be changed to include medical gas safety. It was agreed that the Permit to Work System, as described in the Supplement to HTM22, should be introduced into the Hospital, but with changes and modifications based on discussions in committee and in the light of local engineering practices and administration, as described below.
The Permit to Work System
A Permit to Work Certificate enables control over engineering work so that interruption or alteration of supplies is not possible without the full knowledge and consent of those responsible for the area. It should also give assurance that all necessary tests have been performed before the gas system is taken back into use. Responsibility for the actions to be taken is clearly delineated on the certificate and rests with the person signing the appropriate section.
Scope
1.1 General -The Permit to Work System is applicable to the servicing, repair, alteration and extension of existing installations within the hospital or any action, such as the closure of an isolating valve, which restricts the supply. In some circumstances permits may be necessary before major items of central plant, e.g. manifold, control panel, compressor or vacuum pump (including any standby plant) are isolated prior to servicing, repair or overhaul. In such cases the necessity or otherwise of a Permit to Work Certificate will be at the discretion of the Authorising Officer. The system is applicable to work on installations already in service. In an emergency previous approval for the interruption of supply is not necessary but the Authorising Officer must be notified as soon as possible. An emergency may be considered as an event which seriously endangers the safety of patients or staff.
Routine changing of cylinders -
Permits are not necessary for the routine replacement of cylinders on manifolds nor for the recharging of liquid oxygen vessels, provided there is no danger of the supply being disrupted when these tasks are undertaken.
1.3 Planned preventative maintenance (P.P.M.) work -Permits are not required for routine daily or weekly inspections (where the service is not interrupted) but follow-up work usually involves the issue of a permit. Other P.P.M. inspections involve the issue of a permit.
Levels of hazard
Three orders of hazard occur when work is to be carried out on any part of a piped medical gas installation currently in use. They are broadly defined below but the Authorising Officer will be able to assess the hazard level at the time of preparing the permit and if in doubt he will assess the hazard as being in the higher of two categories. The higher the hazard the greater the care required in the recommissioning procedure.
High hazard work -This includes
work involving the cutting of an in-service pipeline and any work in which brazing is required. Such work introduces hazards of cross connection and/or pollution and causes inconvenience to staff.
Testing: The Authorising Officer should ensure that tests for flow, identity and purity are correctly performed.
Medium hazard work
This includes work at any terminal unit location, boom or pendant where there is a piped service of more than one medical gas in addition to a piped medical vacuum service. This is the case in many operating theatres, anaesthetic rooms, intensive care units, etc. Such works introduce hazards of cross connection in booms and pendants but little or no hazard of pollution. They usually cause inconvenience to staff. Testing: The Authorising Officer should ensure that tests for flow and identity are correctly performed.
Low hazard work -This includes
work on terminal units only and in situations in which there is a piped service of one gas only, for example, oxygen, or in addition to a piped medical vacuum service. This is the case in most ward situations. These works introduce little or no hazard of cross connection but may cause inconvenience to patients and staff.
Signatures
The Permit to Work Certificate may require signatures by the following personnel:-3. 
Duties of Supervisor
The supervisor is responsible for isolating the section of the system on which work is to be carried out, under the direct supervision of the Authorising Officer and obtaining and understanding instructions on the work to be done. He must sign Part 8 of the Permit, acknowledging responsibility for the work, as indicated in the Permit. The work is carried out by workmen who should also sign the Permit and when this has been done the Supervisor will carry out the engineering tests on the completed work under the direct supervision of the Authorising Officer. 5. Procedure 5.1 The Authorising Officer must describe to the Medical Officer or Authorised Nurse the extent to which the supplies will be limited while the work is in progress. He will define the degree of hazard involved on the Permit to Work Certificate.
5.2 Agreement that this work can be carried out without endangering patients must be given by the Medical Officer or Authorised Nurse. The Officer signing the Permit to Work Certificate must satisfy him or herself that all relevant personnel have been informed and that all possible precautions have been taken. He or she may require in addition that the signature of certain senior personnel should be obtained before work proceeds. 5.3 The Authorising Officer must arrange for the isolation of the section to be worked on and describe the work to the Supervisor who will be responsible for the work. The Supervisor's signature indicates that he fully understands the work to be performed and is capable of completing it in the time allocated. 5.4 On completion of the work the Supervisor must request the Authorising Officer to examine and test the installation. 5.5 The Authorising Officer must satisfy himself that the work has been completed satisfactorily and see that necessary tests for flow, identity and purity are performed correctly. He must then sign the Permit to Work Certificate thereby accepting the installation for use. 5.6 The Medical Officer or Authorised Nurse is informed that the system is ready for use. Their signatures indicate that they are satisfied with the work that has been done and that the Permit to Work Certificate is cancelled.
DISCUSSION
Although the Permit to Work Certificate as originally described comprised six sections it was considered appropriate to expand these to nine in order to ensure that every echelon of personnel involved could be identified and to make it similar to other permits in use in the engineering department. An example of the Permit to Work Certificate now in use in this hospital is shown in the appendix. Of equal importance to the Permit to Work Certificate are accurate engineering specifications, the provision of standby equipment such as oxygen cylinders and portable suction machines and the correct testing of gas outlets for flow, pressure, identity and purity. Tests for identity and purity are carried out by the Government Chemical Laboratories of Western Australia at low cost, so that expensive but little-used equipment is not purchased by the hospital and an independent opinion of the safety of gas supplies is available.
Since the permit to Work System was introduced into the hospital eighteen months ago it has been tested on several occasionsthe change-over of a new bulk oxygen supply, the upgrading of oxygen supplies to three wards in a medical block and the commissioning of a new urology theatre suite and a computerised axial tomography room. Identity and purity testing detected a contaminant in an oxygen line to a ward (which was subsequently purified) and the absence of oxygen supply to the scanner room, despite previous flow testing. This proved to be due to a leak in the prime supply.
Although the Permit to Work System is designed to co-ordinate and control work on gas supplies, to protect patients and staff, and to inform all relevant personnel concerned, it cannot be an absolute safeguard in situations where an isolated non-planned act by someone creates a hazard. This was brought to light when, following extensive renovation of the main suite of operating theatres, on the first day of use the oxygen supply to one of the theatres failed. Fortunately the anaesthetic machine carried a Howison alarm and no harm befell the patient. A workman in the adjacent theatre, in the course of removing redundant electrical cable and cleaning up prior to replacing a medical gas dome cover, inadvertently unscrewed the cover on the oxygen supply valve to this theatre and dropped the pressure in the supply line. The Supervisor in charge was severely reprimanded for allowing work to be performed in such a manner as to create a hazardous situation. Nevertheless the event pointed up the need for meticulous care when dealing with medical gas supplies. The Permit to Work System will more easily help to identify where a fault has occurred so that the appropriate responsibility can be allocated and weaknesses in procedure and management identified. I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE HAVING  RECEIVED THIS PERMIT AND STATE  THAT I FULL Y UNDERSTAND MY DUTIES  AND  THE  SAFETY  HAZARDS  ASSOCIATED WITH THE WORK. I AM  SATISFIED THAT I AND THE OFFICER  CARRYING  OUT  IDENTIFICATION AND PURITY TESTS  I CERTIFY THAT IDENTIFICATION AND  PURITY TESTS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT  AND THAT GASES ARE SUITABLE I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THIS  PERMIT HAS BEEN COMPLETED TO MY  SATISFACTION AND THE SYSTEM IS  READY FOR USE. THIS PERMIT IS  HEREBY CANCELLED. NAME _ _ _ _ _ _ _ TIME _ _ _ SIGNATURE _ _ _ _ _ DATE _ _ _ Statements and opinions expressed in the articles and communications herein are those of the authors or advertisers, and the editor and publisher disclaim any responsibility or liability for such material.
